This case presents a constitutional question never addressed by this Court: Shortly after their marriage, the Lovings returned to Virginia and established their marital abode in Caroline County. At the October Term,of the Circuit Court [p3] of Caroline County, a grand jury issued an indictment charging the Lovings with violating Virginia's ban on interracial marriages. On January 6,the Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge, and were sentenced to one year in jail; however, the trial judge suspended the sentence for a period of 25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the State and not return to Virginia together for 25 years.
This case presents a constitutional question never addressed by this Court: Shortly after their marriage, the Lovings returned to Virginia and established their marital abode in Caroline County. On January 6,the Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge, and were sentenced to one year in jail; however, the trial judge suspended the sentence for a period of 25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the State and not return to Virginia together for 25 years.
He stated in an opinion that: Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And, but for the interference with his arrangement, there would be no cause for such marriage. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.
After their convictions, the Lovings took up residence in the District of Columbia. On November 6,they filed a motion in the state trial court to vacate the judgment and set aside the sentence on the ground that the statutes which they had violated were repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
The motion not having been decided by October 28,the Lovings instituted a class action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia requesting that a three-judge court be convened to declare the Virginia anti-miscegenation statutes unconstitutional and to enjoin state officials from enforcing their convictions.
On January 22,the state trial judge denied the motion to vacate the sentences, and the Lovings perfected an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. On February 11,the three-judge District Court continued the case to allow the Lovings to present their constitutional claims to the highest state court.
The Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the anti-miscegenation statutes and, after [p4] modifying the sentence, affirmed the convictions. The two statutes under which appellants were convicted and sentenced are part of a comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at prohibiting and punishing interracial marriages.
Leaving State to evade law. The fact of their cohabitation here as man and wife shall be evidence of their marriage. Sectionwhich defines the penalty for miscegenation, provides: Loving is a "colored person" or that Mr.
Loving is a "white person" within the meanings given those terms by the Virginia statutes. The court also reasoned that marriage has traditionally been subject to state regulation without federal intervention, and, consequently, the regulation of marriage should be left to exclusive state control by the Tenth Amendment.
Nor could it do so in light of Meyer v. Instead, the State argues that the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, as illuminated by the statements of the Framers, is only that state penal laws containing an interracial element [p8] as part of the definition of the offense must apply equally to whites and Negroes in the sense that members of each race are punished to the same degree.
Thus, the State contends that, because its miscegenation statutes punish equally both the white and the Negro participants in an interracial marriage, these statutes, despite their reliance on racial classifications, do not constitute an invidious discrimination based upon race.
The second argument advanced by the State assumes the validity of its equal application theory. The argument is that, if the Equal Protection Clause does not outlaw miscegenation statutes because of their reliance on racial classifications, the question of constitutionality would thus become whether there was any rational basis for a State to treat interracial marriages differently from other marriages.
On this question, the State argues, the scientific evidence is substantially in doubt and, consequently, this Court should defer to the wisdom of the state legislature in adopting its policy of discouraging interracial marriages. The mere fact of equal application does not mean that our analysis of these statutes should follow the approach we have taken in cases involving no racial discrimination where the Equal Protection Clause has been arrayed against a statute discriminating between the kinds of advertising which may be displayed on trucks in New York City, Railway Express Agency, Inc.
New York, U. In these cases, involving distinctions not drawn according to race, the Court has merely asked whether there is any rational foundation for the discriminations, and has deferred to the wisdom of the state legislatures.
In the case at bar, however, we deal with statutes containing racial classifications, and the fact of equal application does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race.
The State argues that statements in the Thirty-ninth Congress about the time of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment indicate that the Framers did not intend the Amendment to make unconstitutional state miscegenation laws.
While these statements have some relevance to the intention of Congress in submitting the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be understood that they pertained to the passage of specific statutes, and not to the broader, organic purpose of a constitutional amendment.
As for the various statements directly concerning the Fourteenth Amendment, we have said in connection with a related problem that, although these historical sources "cast some light" they are not sufficient to resolve the problem; [a]t best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among "all persons born or naturalized in the United States.
Board of Education, U. See also Strauder [p10] v. West Virginia, U. We have rejected the proposition that the debates in the Thirty-ninth Congress or in the state legislatures which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment supported the theory advanced by the State, that the requirement of equal protection of the laws is satisfied by penal laws defining offenses based on racial classifications so long as white and Negro participants in the offense were similarly punished.
The State finds support for its "equal application" theory in the decision of the Court in Pace v. In that case, the Court upheld a conviction under an Alabama statute forbidding adultery or fornication between a white person and a Negro which imposed a greater penalty than that of a statute proscribing similar conduct by members of the same race.
The Court reasoned that the statute could not be said to discriminate against Negroes because the punishment for each participant in the offense was the same. However, as recently as the Term, in rejecting the reasoning of that case, we stated "Pace represents a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause which has not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court.
Florida, supra, at As we there demonstrated, the Equal Protection Clause requires the consideration of whether the classifications drawn by any statute constitute an arbitrary and invidious discrimination.
The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States.supreme court of the united states.
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certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit. see shaw v. reno, u. s. , On February 11, , the three-judge District Court continued the case to allow the Lovings to present their constitutional claims to the highest state court.
The Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the anti-miscegenation statutes and, after . Loving v. Virginia (No. ) Argued: April 10, In upholding the constitutionality of these provisions in the decision below, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia referred to its decision in Naim v.
SHAW, et al., Appellants v. Janet RENO, Attorney General, et al. The Supreme Court of the United States blog. October Term ; October Term ; Shaw v.
United States. Docket No. Op. Below Argument Opinion Vote Author Term; 9th Cir. Oct 4, Tr. Aud. Awarded the Sigma Delta Chi deadline reporting award for online coverage of the Affordable Care Act decision.
Terms that you will need to know on the AP US Government and Politics Exam Learn with flashcards, games, and more — for free. Search. Create. Identify and explain the precedents from the two Supreme Court case decisions that have ruled on gerrymandering.
Baker v. Carr and Wesberry v. Sanders Shaw v. Arizona Supreme Court reversed . In this Court, North Carolina makes two related arguments based on the Dickson litigation: first, that the state trial court’s judgment should have barred this case altogether, under familiar principles of claim and issue preclusion; and second, that the state court’s conclusions should cause us .